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COMMENTS
A PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES:
CHALLENGES TO THE ROLE OF THE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IN A PRESIDENTIAL
IMPEACHMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1998 brought the first impeachment of a President in over a century.'
For the first time, an independent counsel initiated consideration of such a process.
The recent inquiry into the conduct of President Clinton allows the observation of the
office of Independent Counsel in action, and raises serious constitutional questions
regarding impeachment. What role should an officer of the executive branch have in
the potential removal of the head of the executive branch? What relief can a
President seek against a Congress that fails to discharge properly its constitutional
obligations? What defenses can Congress make against such a claim for relief?. The
political events of 1998 and 1999 exposed a confluence of serious holes in
impeachment theory and prosecutorial statutes, which, if exploited could lead to a
serious constitutional crisis.
This comment details the role of the Independent Counsel in the impeachment
process, from creation of the office to the constitutional mechanisms employed by
Congress. Section II examines the justiciability of judicial review of a congressional
impeachment action against the President. Case law on impeachment, the text of the
Constitution, and the writings of the Founding Fathers support judicial review of such
a case. Section I outlines the case an impeached or convicted President could make
1. In 1868 the House of Representatives impeached President Andrew Johnson. See MicHAELJ. GERHARur, THE
FE IMEAcHmErPRocEss 27 n.3 (1996). In 1974 the House Judiciary Committee voted to recommend articles
of impeachment against President Richard Nixon. See id. at 54-55.
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seeking relief from Congress. Finally, Section IV describes the application of the
Independent Counsel Statute to the case of President Clinton. The added dimension
of the Independent Counsel, something the Supreme Court has not yet considered in
an impeachment case, exposes a dangerous inconsistency in the constitutional theory
of impeachment.
I. THE IMPEACHMENT PROCESS
"Impeachment" is the colloquial term for the process of indictment and removal
from office. The Constitution places this procedure largely in the hands of Congress.
2
After Watergate, however, the executive branch was given a role, albeit
unintentionally.3 In 1978, Congress created the Office of Independent Counsel.4 This
action was designed to codify the role of special prosecutors Archibald Cox and Leon
Jaworski in Watergate.5 The statute gives the Independent Counsel, an executive
branch officer, a key role in the impeachment saga.6 The Independent Counsel,
through her statutory responsibility to report "any substantial and credible" evidence
of potentially impeachable offenses to Congress, can force an impeachment issue
upon an unwilling Congress.
7
A. The Independent Counsel
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created the mechanisms of the Office of
Independent Counsel.8 The Act received several renewals in the 1980s and 1990s,
and is scheduled to expire on June 30, 1999. 9 The statute allows for inquiries into
government officials separate from the normal functioning of the Department of
Justice ("DOJ"). t An independent counsel investigates high ranking officials in the
government when such an inquiry by the DOJ would create a conflict of interest."
The statute lists the President first among its list of covered officials.'
2
Whenever the Attorney General receives "information sufficient to constitute
grounds to investigate"' 3 the President,, or any other covered official, she must
2. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
3. See28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 591.
5. See U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (regarding proceedings of special prosecutor investigation into
Watergate); BOB WOODWARD ,& CARL BERNSTIN, THEFINALDAYS 61-71(1976).
6. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
7. Id. § 595(c). "An independent counsel shall advise the House ofRepresentatives ofany substantial and credible
information which such independent counsel receives in carrying out the independent counsel's responsibilities under
this chapter, that may constitute grounds for an impeachment." Id.
8. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
9. See id.
10. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
It. 28 U.S.C. § 591 (e) (1994).
12. See id. § 591(b)(1).
13. Id. at § 592(c)(2).
[Vol. 34-.579
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conduct a preliminary investigation for ninety days. 4 If after this ninety-day period
she determines that there are "reasonable grounds" for continued investigation, she
must submit an application to the court, which the "special division" will review to
determine the necessity of an independent counsel." The special division consists of
a three judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.16
The panel appoints an attorney with "appropriate experience' to carry out the
investigation in a "prompt, responsible and cost-effective manner."' 7 The special
panel also sets the parameters for the investigation with the ability to expand the
scope upon request by either the Attorney General or the Independent Counsel."
Additionally, Congress may initiate an independent counsel investigation
through the Attorney General. 9 The Judiciary Committee of either the House or the
Senate may ask the Attorney General to apply to the special division for an
appointment.20 The Attorney General then has thirty days to begin a preliminary
investigation, after which she must either request the appointment of an Independent
Counsel or file a report with the special division detailing why she did not request an
21appointment.
Once installed, an Independent Counsel receives a broad grant of investigative
powers.? She may, for example, convene a grand jury, grant immunity, inspect tax
returns, and receive national security clearances.' She also may hire such staff as
she deems necessary. 24 Most importantly, the office has few budgetary restrictions?
Upon appointment, only the Attorney General may remove an Independent Counsel
from office.' Such a removal can only take place for "good cause, physical or
mental disability," or any other impairing condition.27 Finally, the Ethics in
Government Act states that the "[I]ndependent [C]ounsel shall advise the House of
Representatives of any substantial and credible information... that may constitute
grounds for an impeachment."2 This provision affords little flexibility. "Shall" in
the statute means "must," thrusting the question of impeachment on the House.
14. See id. § 592(a)-(c).
15. See id.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 49; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,661 (1988).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(2) (1994).
18. See id. § 593(c).
19. See id. § 592(g).
20. See id. § 592(g)(1).
21. See id. § 592(g)(2).
22. See id. § 594.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(1)-(10) (1994).
24. See id. § 594(c).
25. See Morrisonv. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,714 (1988) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (noting that in 1987, four independent
counsel investigations ongoing at the time spent five million dollars, ten percent of the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice budget). In 1989, the Criminal Division requested a budget of fifty-two million dollars with an
additionahteven million dollars for independent counsel, over one-eighth of the budget for the Criminal Division. See
id.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 596 (1994).
27. Id. § 596(a)(1).
28. Id. § 595(c).
1999]
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B. The Congress
Alexis de Tocqueville studied the impeachment power granted to Congress in
the Constitution and predicted in Democracy in America that it would be used
frequently.29 Contrary to de Tocqueville's belief, the House of Representatives has
impeached only sixteen federal officials in over two hundred years.30 Of those
sixteen, the Senate convicted seven,3 acquitted six, 32 and failed to complete action on
three.33
The roles of the two Houses of Congress compare easily to the roles of the two
juries in a criminal trial. As a grand jury brings indictments, the House of
Representatives brings impeachments. 34 As a trial jury passes judgement, the Senate
holds a trial to determine the innocence or guilt of the charged party.35
1. The House
The impeachment process in the House of Representatives can begin on the
initiative of any member who introduces an impeachment resolution.36 Two
additional statutory methods can launch an impeachment. The Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 allows the Judicial
Conference to certify to the House that Congress should consider impeachment of a
29. See GERiARDTr, supra note 1, at 23.
30. See id. at 195 n.3. The fifteen officials prior to President Clinton were: Senator William Blount of Tennessee
(1798-99); U.S. District Judge John Pickering of New Hampshire (1803-04); Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase
(1804-05); U.S. District Judge James Peck of Missouri (1826-3 1); U.S. District Judge West Humpheys of Tennessee
(1862); President Andrew Johnson (1867-68); Secretary ofWar William Belknap (1876); U.S. District Judge Charles
Swayne of Florida (1903-05); Commerce Court Associate Justice Robert Archbald (1912-13); U.S. District Judge
George English oflllinois (1926); U.S. District Judge Harold Louderback ofCalifomia (1932-33); U.S. DistrictJudge
Halsted Ritter of Florida (1936); U.S. District Judge Harry Claibome of Nevada (1986); U.S. District Judge Alcee
Hastings of Florida (1988-89); and U.S. District Judge Walter Nixon of Mississippi (1988-89). See id.
31. See id. at 185 n.4. Those convicted were all judges: Judge Pickering (drunkenness and senility); Judge
Humphreys (supportofthe Confederacy considered rebellion againstthenation); Judge Archbald (bribery); Judge Ritter
(kickbacks and tax evasion); Judge Claibome (tax evasion); Judge Hastings (bribery); and Judge Nixon (false
statements to a grand jury). See id. All were removed from office, and the Senate also disqualified Humphreys and
Archbald from holding any future office of honor or trust in the United States. See id.
32. See id. at 185 n.5. Those acquitted include Associate Justice Chase, Judge Peck, President Johnson, Judge
Swayne, Judge Louderback and President Clinton. See id.; see also Peter Baker & Helen Dewar, Clinton Acquitted;
Two Impeachment Articles Fail to Win Senate Majority; Five Republicans Join Democrats in Voting Down Both
Charges, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1999, at Al.
33. See GRuARDT, supra note 1, at 23. Senator Blount had his impeachment resolution dismissed by the Senate
for lack of jurisdiction. See id. at 185. He argued successfully that he was not a "civil officer," of the United States
and thus not subject to impeachment. See id. at 48. The Senate agreed, and dismissed the House resolution for lack
ofjurisdiction. See id. The Blount case established that senators cannot be impeached, a proposition that has not been
challenged since Blount's case in 1797. See id. Blount was, however, expelled from the Senate, a punishment both
HousesofCongresshold over their members. Seeld.at47-48. SecretaryofWarBelknapresigned hisofficetwohours
before the House voted successfully to impeach him. Seeid.at23. The Senate voted not to convict him on tJ) grounds
that the body did not have jurisdiction to try an individual no longer in office. See id. at 23-24. Judge Engliswesigned
six days before his scheduled Senate trial, and his impeachment resolution received no action. See id. at 24.
34. See U.S. CoNsT.art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
36. See GERHARrr, supra note 1, at28.
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federal judge.37 This format resulted in three successful impeachments and removals
of federal judges in the 1980s.38
Another method for commencing impeachment occurs when the House receives
a report from the Independent Counsel. As in any other impeachment proceeding,
Congress is not bound by due process. Although grand jury testimony is to remain
secret, the immediate release of the report of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr
("Starr Report") illustrates even the House can act in direct defiance of this rule.39
The House Judiciary Committee holds the responsibility of convening impeachment
hearings and recommending impeachment resolutions.' The committee may choose
to hold hearings, hear testimony, inspect evidence, and debate either publicly or in
executive session.4 The charges against the target of the proceedings are compiled
in a resolution, with each charge called an article.42
Like any other piece of legislation, an impeachment resolution receives a pass
or fail recommendation from its committee. 3 Then, the full House debates the
proposed articles.' A bill of impeachment needs a simple majority to pass in the
House.45
2. The Senate
After enacting an impeachment resolution, House members are selected as
attorneys or "managers" for trial in the Senate. 46 Either the Speaker or the Judiciary
Committee select the House managers.47 The accused party chooses his or her own
independent defense attorneys. Supreme Court decisions affirm the Senate's great
latitude in conducting the trial.' Though the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
37. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1994).
38. See GEum'iwr, supra note 1, at 25. This procedure initiated the proceedings against Judges Claiborne,
Hastings, and Nixon. See id.
39. See FED.R. CalM.P. 6(E)(2) ("A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device,
a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government. .. shall not disclose matters occurring
before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules."); see also TiE STARR REPORT, THE OFFICIAL
REPORTOFTHEINDEPENDENTCOuNSEL'S INVESHGATIONOFTHEPRESIDENT38 (PocketBooks 1998) [hereinafter STARR
REPORT].
40. See, e.g., CHARLm L BLACK, JR., IMPEAcHmENt. A HANDBOOK 6 (1974). Although the impeachment
proceeding against Andrew Johnson was driven by Radical Republicans on the Committee for Reconstruction, modem
impeachment hearings, including those against President Richard Nixon, were handled by the House Judiciary
Committee. See JOHNR. LAvrrzRmarnALIMPEACHiMar2l2-13 (1978).
41. See LABOVrrz, supra note 40, at 180-84.
42. See THEODORE H. WHnrE, BREACH OF FArm THE FAiL OF RICHARD NIXON 345-48 (1975). In 1974, the
Judiciary Committee considered several articles of impeachment against President Nixon, including abuse of power,
misusing public funds to improve his private estate in California, and mismanagement of the expansion of the Vietnam
War into Cambodia. See id. at 3 10-11. Only the abuse of power and obstruction of justice articles, which directly
related to Nixon's role in the cover up of White House involvement in the Watergate burglaries, were adopted by the
committee. See id. at 345-48.
43. See G IARDr, supra note 1, at26.
44. See H.R. Res. 611, 105th CONG. (1998).
45. See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
46. See 144CONG.REC.D1217-01(1998).
47. See id. "Managers" is the technical term given to the members of the House of Representatives who act as
prosecuting attorneys in the Senate trial. See id.
48. See supra Section III.
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presides over a trial of the President, a simple majority of the Senate can challenge
and overturn his rulings. 49 Early trials, including that of Andrew Johnson, convened
with the entire Senate sitting as a jury, a practice the Senate resumed for the trial of
President Clinton.50 Impeachment trials of the 1980s, however, found most of the
work done in committee pursuant to Senate Rule XI, where a committee of senators
hears the evidence before a vote in the full Senate.52 Conviction by the Senate
requires a two-thirds majority vote. 3 Upon a guilty verdict, the Senate may remove
a President from office and disqualify him or her from holding any future office.5 4
III. THE AFmERMATH
Once a President has been removed from office, his options become limited. A
conviction in any other court would lead to an appeal of the verdict, just as an
indictment in any other court could lead to a dismissal motion. The Constitution
grants to the House and Senate the "sole" power to bring and try impeachment, power
which makes appeal from an indictment or conviction problematic.55 Since no
President has ever been removed from office, no President has appealed a guilty
verdict. However, some case law from the sparse number of convictions of federal
judges provides arguments that a removed President can seek relief from the judicial
branch.
49. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
50. TheJohnson impeachment grewfromthelingering animosity ofthe Civil War and the assassination ofAbraham
Lincoln. SeeRAouLBE an,IMwEAC r.THECoNsmtnoNALPRoBteas261-63 (1973). Despite his mythic status
in American history, Lincoln's reelection in 1864, and even renomination by the Republican party, were not foregone
conclusions. See JAMEs M. McPHERsoN, BAT= CRYOFFREED=o THE CIviLWAR ERA713-17 (1988). Johnson, a
Democrat from Tennessee who remained loyal to the Union, received the Vice-Presidential nomination to attract the
votes of moderates. See id at 717. After Lincoln's assassination, Johnson angered the congressional Radical
Republicans with his more lenient stance on Reconstruction. See NOEL B. GERSON, THE TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON
66-75 (1977). Congress passed the Tenure of Office Act, which prevented Johnson from replacing members of his
cabinet without congressional approval. See HANs L.TnRE~ossE,IN AcHmExNrOFAPREsiDENT43-45 (1975). Johnson
correctly viewed the act as unconstitutional. See BERG,supra note 50, at 280-85. The House impeached Johnson
for violating the act through his dismissal of the Secretary of War. See DAVIDMILLERDEWrrrTHEIMPEACHmENtAND
TRiALoFANDREWVJOHNSO, 379-85 (1903).
The Johnson case offers an important lesson. Impeachment of a President must be reserved for the most serious
of charges. See id. at 578-79. After his study of Johnson, DeWitt felt impeachment so serious a matter that he
predicted, "[clenturies will pass by before another President of the United States can be impeached, unless the offence
[sic] of which he is accused is clearly non-political and amounts unmistakably to a high crime or misdemeanor." Id.
at 579. Removal of Johnson for the political benefit of congressional leaders would have broken the separation of
powers in favor of a more parliamentary system in which the executive served at the pleasure of the legislature. See
TRtarouss., supra note 50, at 183; BERGER, supra note 50, at 295-96.
51. See Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239,240 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
52. See id.
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A. Justiciability of an Appeal of an Impeachment Action: Case Law
1. Ritter v. United States6
Halsted Ritter was the first defendant in an impeachment case to seek judicial
review of his conviction." In 1936, the Senate removed Ritter from his position as
judge of a United States District Court for tax evasion and bribery." le brought suit
in the United States Court of Claims seeking back pay on the theory that the charges
against him did not constitute a high crime or misdemeanor.5 9 The Court of Claims
simply refused to rule on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.60
In so doing, the Court of Claims considered constitutional theory and concluded
they could not review the actions of the Senate:
But it is said the Senate acts as a high court of impeachment and that, being for the
purposes of an impeachment trial as a court, if it acts without constitutional
authority its judgements are a nullity. But what court is authorized to review its
judgements and set them aside? The writers on constitutional law are unanimous
in holding that there is none.6
Ritter indicated courts would duck review of impeachment rulings in deference
to the judgments of Congress.62 In essence, judicial review of impeachment rulings
became a political question. This view remained the dominant theory until the
Supreme Court began shrinking the application of political question doctrine.
2. Powell v. McCormac 3
Adam Clayton Powell was prevented from taking his seat in the Ninetieth House
of Representatives by a vote of the membership.64 The House claimed the right to
judge the qualifications of its members based on Article I, Section 5, Clause 1.65
Powell was charged with financial impropriety and deemed unqualified to serve in the
House.6
6
The Supreme Court disagreed and ordered Powell's exclusion expunged.67
While the House had the ability to judge the qualifications of its members, those
56. 84 CL CI. 293 (1936).
57. See Ritter, 84 Ct. C1. at 294.
58. See id. at 293-94.
59. See id. at 294.
60. See id. at 296-98.
61. Id. at 296.
62. See Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. C1. 293 (1936).
63. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
64. See id. at 490.
65. See id. at491.
66. See id. at 492.
67. See id. at512.
1999]
7
Brown: A Plague on Both Your Houses: Challenges to the Role of the Indep
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998
586 TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:579
qualifications were restricted to those listed in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2: age and
inhabitancy.68 This decision contained several congruencies to an impeachment
review. First, the Court did not shy away from overturning a political decision of the
Congress. 69 Before Powell, this certainly would have been dismissed as a political
question.7 Powell, however, established that the Court could render decisions on
political issues concerning the political branches.7 The Constitution expressly
granted Congress the right to screen its membership and the Court chose to review
that right.7
The Court's decision to review and overturn a congressional decision
constitutionally committed to the legislative branch, gives hope to a President seeking
review of an impeachment action. Much like the qualification clause, the
Constitution grants to Congress impeachment power through the impeachment and
conviction clauses.73 If the Court can hear a case of legislative action on a member
of the legislative branch, it might also hear a case of legislative action on a member
of the executive branch. Indeed, the Court may be more likely to consider an
interbranch dispute rather than an intrabranch conflict, as in Powell; this would allow
the Court to officiate between two branches rather than dictate to one branch alone.74
Second, Powell established the Court could reverse a punitive decision by
Congress.75 Exclusion from taking a seat in the House punished Powell by denying
him his right to hold office.76 Powell also lost the seniority rights and pension accrual
that came with his seat.77 This same deprivation of rights and privileges would
support a review of a Senate conviction of a President. A removed President can lose
not only the office of the presidency and the right to hold future political positions,
but also pension benefits and Secret Service protection.78
Third, the Powell Court refused to question the methods by which the House
68. See id. at 537-39.
69. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,518 (1969).
70. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). In Colegrove, the Supreme Court refused to hear a challenge
to legislative district lines that denied one person, one vote. See id. at 550. Colegrove concerned the apportionment
of the congressional districts of Illinois. See id. Illinois gerrymandered its apportionment so that urban districts
contained over four times as many people as rural districts. See id. at 555. The Court compiled evidence that showed
that most ofthe states adopted this practice; since rural interests dominated most state legislatures, there was little chance
that the states would correct this imbalance on their own. See id. at 557-60. This essentially was the same issue
presented in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Baker produced a different result for two reasons. First, Baker
concerned a reapportionment of state legislative districts, not federal. See id. at 187. Although both cases would have
ultimately ordered action from state legislatures, the method in Baker was less confrontational. Second, and most
importantly, the Court shifted left between 1946 and 1969, with the justices more willing to venture into political
questions and less likely to duck issues. See, e.g.,Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
71. See Powell v. McCormack,395 U.S. 486,518 (1969).
72. See id. at 548.
73. See U.S. CoNsT. art. , § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
74. See, e.g., INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
75. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,550 (1969).
76. See id. at 486.
77. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,492 (1969).
78. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cI. 7.
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arrived at its decision: the hearings in committee and the votes on the floor. 9 The
Court focused instead on the final result. Fourth, the Court did not avoid a decision
on grounds of mootness. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, Powell
had already been reelected to the ninety-first Congress.' Although he could not be
retroactively seated in the adjourned ninetieth Congress, Powell did have his backpay
and seniority reinstated.
81
Mootness would constitute a primary argument against judicial review of a
Senate conviction of a President. As a policy matter, not even a convicted President
could argue for a revolving door in the presidency whereby a President is convicted,
a Vice-President is installed, and the deposed President then resumes the office after
judicial review.82 Powell, however, illustrates the point that a convicted President
would have some relief to gain from judicial review of a Senate conviction other than
restoration to the presidency.
3. Nixon v. United States
83
The question of judicial review of an impeachment proceeding finally received
a more modern ruling in Nixon v. U.S.84 Walter Nixon, a federal district court judge
from Mississippi, was indicted in a criminal trial for influencing a local district
attorney not to prosecute a family friend.85 After his conviction in criminal court and
sentence to prison, Nixon refused to resign from the United States District Court,
unlike his Presidential namesake.86 The House impeached Judge Nixon based on his
earlier conviction and for bringing "disrepute on the [flederal judiciary. ' '87 The
Senate, pursuant to Impeachment Rule XI, conducted a committee review of the
charges against Nixon. Then, the committee reported to the full Senate.88 After
considering the record the Senate voted to convict Nixon.89
On appeal, Nixon argued Rule XI unconstitutionally delegated the authority to
try him to a committee, and thus prevented the whole Senate from having full
participation in the trial.' Instead of ruling on Rule X's constitutionality, the Court
79. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 511-12. The Powell Court did not order the House of Representatives to alter its
method of holding hearings on the exclusion resolution for any future exclusion cases. See id. The decision instead
reversed the product of those hearings and the action by the full House. See id.
80. See id. at 495. A possible suit by a President already removed from office by vote of the House and Senate
would first face the question of mootness. See id. Even though the removed President may not be returned to office,
he still, like Powell, could receive his back salary, and have his pension, office staff, and Secret Service protection
restored. See id.
81. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 550.
82. See BLACK, supra note 40, at 53-54.
83. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
84. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 224.
85. See Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239,240 (D.C. Cir. 199 1).
86. See Brendan C. Fox, The Justiciability of Challenges to the Senate Rules of Procedure for Impeachment
Trials, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1275 (1992) for a comprehensive overview of the facts of the case.
87. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,227 (1993).
88. See id. at 227.
89. See id. at 228.
90. See Fox, supra note 86, at 1283-84. Nixon argued the Senators on the committee hearing evidence in any
impeachment trial pursuant to Rule XI are unlikely to muster the two-thirds vote necessary to convict. See id.
1999]
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deemed the claim a political question and refused to resolve it.9
The Court reasoned the word "try" in the Senate's impeachment clause grant
did not impose any limits on the Senate's ability to frame its own proceedings.'
Further, Rule XI did not infringe upon Nixon's right to be tried by the Senate because
"try" was not subject to any further constitutional abridgements in the text of the
Constitution-a distinction from the court's qualification in Powell.9 3
A challenge of a presidential impeachment would be distinguishable from the
Nixon case on two grounds, both dealing with separation of powers. Such a case
would pit the executive branch against the legislative, while Nixon called for the
judiciary to review the removal of one of its own members.94 A disturbance in the
separation of powers concerned the Nixon court. Once a federal judge enters office,
impeachment is the only direct check the legislative branch has on the judiciary.95
Judicial overturning of the sole check on the judiciary, the Court reasoned, would be
improper.' A similar argument would be inapplicable to the President. The
legislature has numerous checks on the presidency aside from the impeachment
process.97 The Constitution itself treats a presidential impeachment trial differently
than any other.98 By naming the Chief Justice as the presiding officer at an
impeachment trial of the President, the Constitution forces upon the judicial branch
an active role in this executivellegislative dispute.99 While the constitutionality of
judicial review of a removal of a judicial branch official would obstruct the
separation of powers, such a review of an executive branch removal would be highly
consistent. "
Nixon did not challenge the constitutional standard of impeachment and claim
that his offenses did not rise to "high crimes and misdemeanors," nor did Nixon raise
a separation of powers issue.' O' The appeal to reverse the Senate verdict was based
on the inadequacy of the Senate's internal procedures."° This was a decision of
procedure and not of law; the Court cannot question how the Senate goes about
convicting, but left unresolved the issue of reviewing the final verdict. In this sense,
Nixon is consistent with Powell, where the Court ruled on the end product, not the
means to the end.
91. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,237-38 (1993).
92. See id.
93. See id. at 229-30.
94. See id. at 226.
95. See Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
96. See id. at 244; see also THEFEERAusTrNos. 65 and 66 (Alexander Hamilton).
97. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 3 (overriding of veto); art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (power to advise and consent to
nominations, approve treaties); THEFEDERAUsrNo. 51 (James Madison).
98. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., United Statesv. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.361 (1989);
INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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B. Justiciability ofan Appeal ofan ImpeachmentAction: Legacies of the Founders
Judicial review of a presidential impeachment conviction would be a question
of first impression. Impeachment was one of the only judicial powers given to
another branch in the Constitutional Convention.0 3 Early versions of the Constitution
gave authority over impeachment trials to the Supreme Court. 0" Ultimately, the
Court lost this authority, primarily since the President ultimately could be tried by the
justices he appointed himself."05 James Madison and Charles Pickney disagreed,
arguing that Congress would remove the President "under the influence of heat and
faction," which in fact nearly happened to Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton.'06
WhiletheFramers ultimately placed removal authority in the legislativebranch,
they did not intend for it to run unbridled. 7 The Convention rejected removal for
"maladministration" in favor of the more technical "high crimes and
misdemeanors."' 8 The removal power was to be exercised carefully. Professor
Raoul Berger, the first author to articulate the case for judicial review of
impeachment decisions based on Powell, analogizes that just as the judiciary is bound
by self-restraint in keeping judicial power within bounds, so too must the Senate use
self-restraint in impeachment trials.'" This self-restraint, however, may be too much
to ask from elected partisan officials. The alternative to Senate self-restraint is
judicial review."0
Finally, the meaning of the word "sole" lies at the heart of any argument for
judicial review of a Senate conviction of the President."' Article I, Section 2, Clause
5 gives the House the "sole" power of impeachment; Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
gives the Senate the "sole" power to try impeachments." 2 This seemingly ends the
issue. Ritter reasoned that "sole" meant "no other tribunal should have any
jurisdiction of the cases tried under the provisions with reference to impeachment."'"13
Ultimately, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the
Constitution."' This concept finds its roots in Marbury v. Madison in which the
Court recognized its duty to act as interpreter of the Constitution" 5 and was
reaffirmed in Baker v. Carr, the leading modern case on justiciability of the political
question." 16 The judiciary determines if any branch acts beyond its constitutional
mandate by "[d]eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
103. See THE FDERAusr NO. 65 (Alexander Hanilton).
104. See id.
105. See id.; THEFEDERAsT No. 66 (Alexander Hamilton); BERGER, supra note 50, at 112-13.
106. BERGER, supra note 50, at 112-14, 252.
107. See id. at 103-21.
108. See id. at 107.
109. See id. at 118.
110. See id. at 118-21.
Il1. See U.S. CoNST.art I, § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
112. See U.S. CONsr.art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
113. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. CI.293,296 (1936).
114. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
115. Seeid. at177.
116. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate
interpreter."1 7  Therefore, the Court determines the parameters of a branch's
authority and whether the branch has successfully stayed within the limits of their
enumerated powers."' As with Powell and Nixon, Baker supports the proposition
that the Court cannot question congressional procedure in arriving at its decision, but
may question the end result of the congressional action." 9
Rejection of judicial review and recognition of the "sole" right of Congress to
conduct impeachment proceedings denies the defendant in an impeachment case the
right to appeal. Unlike criminal courts, there are no appellate levels to Congress.
Alexander Hamilton questioned the lack of judicial review in Federalist 66 when he
wrote, "the provision in question confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the
same body, in violation of that important and well-established maxim which requires
a separation between the different departments of power."' 20 The complete grant of
the authority to remove the President and subsequent immunity from judicial review
is incongruent with the checks and balances foundation undergirding the U.S.
Constitution. 121
Justice White in a Nixon concurrence suggests an alternate reading of "sole."' 22
Under an alternative reading of "sole," there is no violation of the separation of
powers, only an interbranch dispute. "Sole" limits the House from taking the
Senate's power and vice versa; the danger lies in encroachment from the other House,
not a coordinate branch." Such a reading led Justice White to conclude:
That the word "sole" is found only in the House and Senate Impeachment Clauses
demonstrates that its purpose is to emphasize the distinct role of each in the
impeachment process. As the majority notes, the Framers, following English
practice, were very much concerned to separate the prosecutorial from the
adjudicative aspects of impeachment. Giving each House "sole" power with
respect to its role in impeachments effected this division of labor. While the
majority is thus right to interpret the term "sole" to indicate that the Senate ought
to "function independently and without assistance or interference, it wrongly
identifies the Judiciary, rather than the House, as the source of potential
interference.. 124
117. Id.at2ll.
118. See BERGER, supra note 50, at 118-19.
119. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 33 1. The Supreme Court did not specify how the Tennessee legislature should draw
their legislative district lines but only to redraw them equitably. See id. at 325.
120. THEFEDERAuSTNO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton).
121. See BERGER, supra note 50, at 117-18.; TI-sFEDERAUSTNO. 48 (James Madison).
122. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,241 (1993) (White, J., concurring).
123. See id.
124. Id. at 241-242, (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 34.579
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IV. IMPORTANCE OFTHE ISSUE: THE CASE OF PRESIDENT CLINTON
A. The President's Claim for Relief
Analysis of the impeachment clauses, the cases interpreting them, the
congressional powers surrounding them, and historical tradition all leave open the
possibility that an impeached President may seek judicial review of congressional
action, particularly action driven by an independent counsel.'2 President Clinton and
his legal team actively considered filing such a suit shortly after his impeachment in
December 1998.'26
A presidential suit to block congressional action presents a two part argument
that would force Congress into mutually exclusive defenses:
First, federal courts have jurisdiction to review impeachment proceedings. The
judiciary, in its role as final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution, can rule on
whether the Congress correctly interpreted the clause "high crimes and
misdemeanors."' 7 If the Congress misapplied the impeachment clause, sanctions
against the President should be overturned.
In the alternative, the grant to the Independent Counsel represents an
unconstitutional delegation of pure legislative authority to the executive branch. The
Independent Counsel must report evidence of impeachable offenses."2 Hence, the
Independent Counsel must decide if presidential behavior is a "high crime or
misdemeanor," and interpret that phrase. 9 However, this represents a violation of
the separation of powers in that it allows a branch to judge itself. Thus, any punitive
action taken by Congress based solely on information provided by the Independent
Counsel must be overturned.
Congress must defend the two arguments with inherently illogical responses:
(1) Only Congress may interpret the impeachment clauses, but (2) the executive and
judicial branches may interpret the impeachment clauses.
B. The Grant to the Independent Counsel
The Independent Counsel sent a referral to Congress on September 11, 1998,
125. See BERGER, supra note 50, at 300-0 1. "[A]s Voltaire said ofGod: ifjudicial review did not exist, it would
have to be invented." Id. at 301.
126. See Ruth Marcus & Helen Dewar, Clinton Team Considers Legal Fight Against Trial; Lawmakers on Both
Sides Callfor Quick Resolution, WASH. PosT, Dec. 21, 1998, at Al.
127. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
128. See28 U.S.C. §595(c) (1994).
129. See supra note 162 fora comparison between the Starr Report and the final articles of impeachment approved
by the Judiciary Committee and the full House. The impeachment resolution approved by the Judiciary Committee
almost completely matched the offenses deemed impeachable by the Starr Report, and the committee relied totally on
the Starr Report evidence to substantiate the articles. The Independent Counsel was the de facto drafter of the
impeachment resolutions, and determinant of impeachable offenses. See id.
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pursuant to § 595(c) of the Ethics in Government Report. 3 Popularly called the
Starr Report, the document outlined eleven impeachable actions including perjury,
obstruction of justice, and abuse of power. 3 1
The Independent Counsel investigation of President Clinton began in 1994 as
an inquiry into the Clintons' real estate dealings in Arkansas. 32 Judge Starr and his
predecessor, Robert Fiske, gradually expanded the scope of the investigation through
requests to the special division. 33 The judiciary approved applications to allow the
Independent Counsel to probe the business dealings of Clinton associates which
required testimony from the President and other White House officials well before the
investigation of the Lewinsky affair began. 134 By President Clinton's first tryst with
White House intern Monica Lewinsky, the Independent Counsel inquiry was already
more than a year old. 35
The Ethics in Government Act weathered a constitutional challenge in Morrison
v. Olson.'36 The case arose when the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
refused to provide documents to the House on grounds of executive privilege. 37 DOJ
officials were investigated for allegedly giving false testimony to Congress and
obstructing justice in their treatment of the documents. 38 Olson argued the Ethics in
Government Act was unconstitutional.139 Additionally, Olson contended that because
the Independent Counsel was an official of the executive branch, she could not be
appointed by anyone other than the President."' Thus, Olson claimed, the
appointment of the Independent Counsel by a panel of the judiciary was
inappropriate. 4 '
The Supreme Court upheld the Ethics in Government Act. 42 The Appointments
Clause of the Constitution grants the President the authority to appoint "principle
officers" of the United States, while giving Congress the power to vest the
appointment of "inferior officers" in the courts. 43 Deeming the Independent Counsel
an inferior officer," 4 the Court held that Congress did not overstep its authority in
granting the special division the power to appoint the Independent Counsel. 45
Morrison also established that the Attorney General has the direct authority to
130. See id.; STARR REPORT, supra note 39, at 21.
131. See STARR REPORT, supra note 39, at 21-22.
132. United States v. Tucker, 78 F. 3d 1313, 1315 (8th Cir. 1996).
133. See STARR REPORT, supra note 39, at 32-33.
134. See United States v. McDougal, 940 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
135. See STARRREPORT, supra note 39, at 69. The report states that the first meeting between President Clinton and
Monica Lewinsky occurred during thegovernment shutdown in November 1995, oneyearafterthe original Whitewater
inquiry began. See id. at 71-74.
136. 487 U.S. 654 (1986).
137. See id. at665.
138. See id.at666.
139. See id. at668.
140. See id. at 673.
141. See id. at 668-70.
142. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,669 (1986).
143. U.S.Co,4sr. art. II § 2, cl. 2. This clause also authorizes the Special division to establish the jurisdiction ofthe
Special Prosecutor. See id.
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remove the prosecutor from office. 46 This is significant in that no precedent exists
for a challenge of an Independent Counsel's purview in investigating or
recommending the impeachment of a President. Additionally, Morrison affirmed the
ability of the special division to perform "administrative" functions regarding the
Office of Independent Counsel, including declaring any investigation closed. 47
"[T]he functions that the Special Division is empowered to perform are not inherently
'executive'; indeed, they are directly analogous to functions federal judges perform
in other contexts, such as deciding whether to allow disclosure of matters occurring
before a grand jury."' Before sending the Starr Report to Congress, Starr asked the
special division for permission to release evidence obtained from the grand jury,
evidence that a prosecutor cannot release without court permission. 49 This gives the
judicial branch a role in defining an impeachable offense. The special division agreed
the evidence Starr obtained was sufficient to justify its release in the Starr Report.151
In so doing, the special division determined the evidence did rise to the level of "high
crimes and misdemeanors." '' This constitutes a violation of separation of powers.
In his dissent in Morrison, Justice Scalia urged the Ethics in Government Act
be struck down." 2 Because the Independent Counsel exercised executive powers and
was controlled by someone other than the President, the Act vested executive powers
improperly.1 53 To that end, Scalia argued the statute would weaken the presidency
by allowing the prosecutor to conduct impeachment investigations in lieu of an
investigation by a Congress unwilling to accept the political risk of such a venture. 154
How much easier it is for Congress, instead of accepting the political damage
attendant to the commencement of impeachment proceedings against the President
on trivial grounds-or, for that matter, how easy it is for one of the President's
political foes outside of Congress-simply to trigger a debilitating criminal
investigation of the Chief Executive under this law. 5
The appointment of an Independent Counsel may be initiated by a request to the
Attorney General to investigate the President, and the Independent Counsel can
continually expand the jurisdiction of the probe any time the prosecutor encounters
evidence tangential to the original scope of the investigation. 56 President Clinton
146. See id. at 682.
147. Seeid.
148. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,681 (1986).
149. See FED. R. CRtNL P. 6(E); STARR REPORT, supra note 39, at 38 (detailing the application of the Office of
Independent Counsel for release of the grand jury material).
150. See STARR REPORT, supra note 39, at 38.
151. See id.
152. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 705.
154. See id. at713.
155. Id.
156. History best illustrates this danger. Almost every presidency contains numerous closet skeletons that a
determined probe could uncover. Given the opportunity to investigate one aspect of a presidential administration, a
prosecutor could soon expand jurisdiction to include the entire political and personal background of the President.
Consider the presidencies between World War I and Watergate:
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weathered such an investigation.1
57
Investigation by Independent Counsel poses a greater danger than investigation
by a congressional committee. As University of Tulsa Law School Dean Martin H.
Belsky argued:
Lyndon Johnson: LBJ's road to the White House contained abundant dark periods. Johnson won election to
the Senate from Texas in 1948 by eighty-seven votes out of more than nine hundred thousand cast, a margin that earned
him the sarcastic nickname, "Landslide Lyndon." See DoRis KEARNS, LYNDON JoHNsoN AND THE AMERICAN DREAM
101 (1997). The actual voting contained numerous examples of voter fraud on behalf of the Johnson campaign,
including margins of one hundred to one in some counties. See, e.g., ROBERTA. CARo, MEANsoFAscExr THEYEARs
OFLYNDoNJOHNsON 308-13,318-21 (1990). Johnson's relationship with the Brown and Root Construction Company
raised problems of suspicious campaign contributions and questionable awards of government contracts. See ROBERT
A. CARo, THE PATHTO POWER 458-68,577-78 (1983).
John Kennedy: Camelot under the scrutiny of an independent counsel may have been the most heavily
investigated administration of all. JFK's 1960 presidential campaign weathered allegations of ties to organized crime
and of voting fraud, especially in the West Virginia primary and in Richard Daley's Chicago. See RICHRRnvEs,
PREsIHr)vrKa .PtrOaFn OPowER 110(1993); SEYmOURHERSCH,THEDARKSIDEOFCAMELOT9O-141, 165-67
(1997). Kennedy's personal life was also suspect. Among his legendary rumored affairs was a liaison with a suspected
East German spy in 1963. See id. at 387-88,390,398-400.
Dwight Eisenhower While in command of the allied forces in Europe during World War 11, Eisenhower had
an alleged affair with a subordinate member of his staff, Kay Summersby. See PIERs BRRED.EON, IKE: His LIFE AND
TIMEs 124(1986). As President, Eisenhower covered up the role of the military in the crash of a U2 spy plane inside
the Soviet Union. See STEPHENE. AMBROSE, EisENHowER: VOLUMETwo, THEs PsIDENr 572-75 (1984).
Harry Truman: Truman's early political career was sponsored by Kansas City political boss Tom Pendergast,
who helped Truman become an executive of Kansas City's Jackson County, and later United States Senator from
Missouri. See DAviD McCua.OuGH, TRuMAN 160-84,204 (1992). The Pendergast organization participated in the
typicalcity machine activities, including acquisitionofgovemmentconstruction contracts awarded by Truman'scounty
commission. See id.
Calvin Coolidge/Warren Harding: Harding died in 1923 just as the Teapot Dome scandal began to reach
critical mass. See BuRTNOoGLE, TEAi'rDone OuANDPoLxncs i um 1920s 58 (1962). Had he lived, Harding
may have faced charges from his involvement in allocating the use of federal lands for oil drilling by his campaign
contributors. See id. at 47. Coolidge as Vice-President may have attracted allegations similar to those directed at
George Bush, Vice-President during Irah-Contra. See ROBERTH.FERRE, TREPREsiDENcYOF CALVINCOO~t i 44-
45(1998).
Woodrow Wilson: While campaigning for ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Wilson suffered a
stroke that paralyzed his left side. See EDwI A. WErNSTEiN, WOODRoW WDSoN: A MEIMCALAND PSYCHOLOGICAL
BioG"RAPHY 353 (1981). With her invalid husband unable to fulfill his duties, Edith Wilson shut the President off in
a sick room in the White House and channeled the government through her. See id. at 355-61.
157. Such a "connect the dots" investigation led to the proceedings against President Clinton. The Office of
Independent Counsel's investigation began with the Clintons' involvement in the Whitewater land deal. SeeJms B.
STEWART, BLOOD SPoRr. THE PREsIDExrAND HIS ADvERsARIEs 95-105, 133,375-402 (1996).
How does a 1978 land deal produce a 1998 impeachment? The investigation of the Clintons' involvement in
Whitewater led to requests for expansion of the jurisdiction of the Office of Independent Counsel to include a wide
dragnet into the backgrounds of the Clintons and their friends. See id.; see also United States v. McDougal, 137 F.3d
547 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. McDougal, 92 F.3d701
(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, (8th Cir. 1996); Resolution Trust Corp. v. McDougal, 158
F.R.D. I (D.D.C. 1994); United States v. Hubbell, 1999 WL 26878 (D.D.C. 1999); United States v. McDougal, 940
F.Supp. 224 (E.D.Ark. 1996).
None of these scandals found their way into the Independent Counsel's referral of impeachable offenses to the
House. Because of their existence, however, a prosecutorial staff existed and was ready to act immediately on the
Lewinsky case. See STARR REPORT, supra note 39, at 22-24. The jurisdiction eventually granted the Office of
Independent Counsel ran the gamut from the President's (and First Lady's) business dealings prior to assuming the
presidency to his conduct of his official duties while President to his personal affairs while in office. In short, all aspects
of the Clintons' public and their private lives while in office were subject to investigation. Now consider the travails
of former Presidents as outlined in the previous footnote. History reveals that the presidency has grown so complex in
the twentieth century that no person can have the career necessary to win the office and then execute the office
successfully without encountering at least the appearance of impropriety of the level to trigger some call for an
independent counsel investigation. Once initiated, the experiences of the Clintons prove a determined prosecution can
cast light into the deepest shadows of a President's life.
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[S]pecial prosecutors or independent counsel, and their grand juries, selected by
and under the supervision of the federal courts, have broad power to investigate the
President. They and their staffs secure evidence, subpoena witnesses, organize
testimony and exhibits, make plea bargains, and attempt to frame public opinion
by selective leaks and official reports. They also provide the raw material for the
official impeachment process. Information unavailable to an impeachment inquiry
directly can be turned over to the inquiry by the independent counsel. The
impeachment process described in the Constitution, involving the Congress, is at
the end, and not the beginning of any investigation. The disputes over the
impeachment process do not occur in the official political arena of the Congress;
they occur in the grand juries and the courts... the technical rule seems to be that
issues involving impeachment are non-justiciable, and the courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, are not supposed to get involved. The legal reality is that the
courts, and especially the Supreme Court, have become the arena for investigating
the President. Their decisions determine the nature of any investigation, its scope,
the evidence available, the rights of the President and even the identity of the chief
inquisitor.15
8
Once appointed, an Independent Counsel is required by statute to report any evidence
of impeachable offenses. 59 With the concurrence of the special division, the
prosecutor can refer her subject to Congress for impeachment proceedings."6 This
necessitates an interpretation of "high crimes and misdemeanors" by the Independent
Counsel before making the referral. The Independent Counsel must decide if the
offenses of which she accuses the President are serious enough to deserve
impeachment proceedings by Congress. Otherwise, the Independent Counsel would
make no such referral and deposit her findings with the Archivist of the United
States. 161 Congress implicitly recognizes this surrender of authority to interpret"high
crimes and misdemeanors" through its actions on impeachment. 62 The empirical
record of Congress on impeachment reveals Congress now expects the beginnings of
impeachment proceedings from the other branches; it has delegated away its
158. Martin H. Belsky, nvestigating The President: The Supreme Court and the ImpeachmentProcess, 34TULsA
L.J. 289,305 (1999).
159. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994).
160. See id.
161. See id. § 594(k).
162. All of the offenses alleged in the articles of impeachment were also deemed impeachable conduct by the Starr
Report. Article I accused the President of perjurious testimony before the grand jury, and article II charged him with
obstruction ofjustice. See H.R. Res. 611,105th Cong. (1998). The Starr Report alleged eleven possible impeachable
ground. See STARRREPORT, supra note 39, at 296-97. Ground 2 formed the basis for impeachment article I. Compare
id. at 319-327, with H.R. Res. 611, 105th CONG. (1998). Grounds 5 through 10 became article II. Compare STARR
REPORT, supra note 39,346-402, with H.R. Res. 611, 105th CONd. (1998). Grounds 1, 2 and 4 regarding perjury in
a civil deposition and ground I 1 regarding abuse of power translated into two articles proposed by the Judiciary
Committee but rejected by the full House. See STARR REPORT, supra note 39, at 296-97; see also Peter Baker and
Juliet Eilperin, GOP Blocks Democrats' Bid to Debate Censure in House; Panel Votes Final, Trimmed Article of
Impeachment, WAs. POST, Dec. 13, 1998, at Al.
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authority. 63
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr displayed the new power of his office in the
impeachment of President Clinton. 64 The House of Representatives accepted his
recommendations.' 6 The final articles of impeachment adopted by the House on
December 15, 1998, mirrored the grounds for impeachment endorsed by Starr.'
Moreover, the House accepted the Starr Report testimony as the factual record on
which to base the articles.' 67 In practice, as well as theory, Congress abdicated its
impeachment responsibility.
C. The Defense
A challenge to an impeachment verdict would force congressional defenders of
the action into an untenable defense. To rebut the justiciability of an appeal to
overturn congressional action, the defense must claim the Constitution granted
Congress the "sole" ability to judge impeachments.' 68 No appeal can be heard
because only the legislative branch can determine the meaning of "high crimes and
misdemeanors." This ability cannot be usurped or encroached upon by another
branch. To defend the investigation of the Independent Counsel, the defense must
argue that the prosecutor, an executive branch official, has the authority to interpret
"high crimes and misdemeanors" in evaluating what conduct is referable to the House
under § 595(c) of the Ethics in Government Act. 69 Further, the defense must contend
the special division can endorse the interpretation of the Independent Counsel by
allowing the release of grandjury evidence. If the Congress can delegate its exclusive
authority, the court can review it. That would lead, inevitably, to an appeal of the
merits of Congress's decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The events of 1998 and 1999 moved the potential of an appeal of a presidential
impeachment from the unthinkable to the realm of the possible. Before challenging
an impeachment verdict from Congress, a President must consider a plethora of
political factors: the effect of the challenge on the development of his policies, the
fate of his party in future elections, the inevitable fluctuations in prestige of the nation
in the eyes of foreign countries, and the impact on the office of the presidency.
163. See supra note 162. Since enacting the Ethics in Government Act, Congress has not initiated an impeachment
proceeding on its own, waiting instead for referrals from the Independent Counsel or the Judicial Conference. See id.;
see also supra notes 37-38. This has occurred in spite of the exponential growth of the federal government and the
heightened interest of the media in creating atmospheres of scandal.




168. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. , § 3, cl. 6.
169. 28 U.S.C. § 595 (1994).
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Should such a case proceed, the judiciary would face a constitutional question
unparalleled in American history: a choice between the survival of a presidency and
the credibility of Congress. No good can come of such a choice.
Challenge of a House impeachment seems much more likely than of a Senate
conviction. As the impeachment of President Clinton illustrated, the narrowest
majority can produce an impeachment. Driven by a determined Independent Counsel,
these impeachments can result from curious grounds. Impeachment should not
become a constitutional dead letter, but neither should it become just another weapon
of political struggle. Injection of the Independent Counsel into impeachment has
made it just that.
Before an appeal occurs, each branch should take steps to prevent it. The
judiciary must take an unequivocal stand on the justiciability of all impeachment
appeals, including those from the executive branch. The President and the DOJ must
prepare tough regulations to accomplish the spirit of the Ethics in Government Act
within the executive branch, without the clumsy mechanisms of the Office of
Independent Counsel.
Finally, the legislative branch must abolish the Independent Counsel statute.
The Independent Counsel enabling statute expires on June 30, 1999, and should not
receive renewal. If constitutional theory accepts that a President cannot be indicted
in court and may only be charged with an offense through the impeachment process,
then Congress alone should investigate the President. The end product of a DOJ
investigation is a criminal indictment. If a President cannot be charged this way, the
DOJ should have no role in the investigation of a President, through the Independent
Counsel or otherwise. If a President can be punished by Congress alone, then
Congress must conduct the prosecution itself. To abate somewhat political influence,
investigations of the President should be placed under the purview of the General
Accounting Office. Congress would be free to conduct its own inquiry with or
without the input of the Independent Counsel. The alternative is the continued
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